Business Historical Society, 16 (1942) , 34-39, reprinted in F.C. Lane and Jelle Riemersma, eds., Enterprise and Secular Change (New York, 1953), 80-85; Raymond De Roover, 'Money, Banking, and Credit in Medieval Bruges,' Journal of Economic History, 2 (1942) : Supplement, 52-65; Raymond De Roover, 'Le contrat de change depuis la fin du treizième siècle jusqu'au début du dix-septième', Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 25 (1946-47), 111-28; Raymond De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: Italian Merchant-Bankers, Lombards, and (Cambridge, 1963) , 42 -118. eminent authority on medieval banking, further argued that an ancillary Italian commercial development helps to explain the post-1320 redundancy of the Champagne Fairs and its itinerant trade: the establishment of branch firms and permanently-stationed factors. They transacted trade and finance by a sedentary principal-agent system involving the new four-party bills of exchange, which quickly displaced the two-or three-party lettres de foire, or the instrumenta ex causa cambii, which merchants had long been using at the Champagne Fairs. propounded the thesis that the relative balance between maritime and continental trade, and the relative prosperity of the latter, had played a fundamental role in determining long-waves, or cycles of expansion and decline in the European economy up to the eighteenth century. Thus, the revival, spread, and intensification of overland trade between NW Europe and the Mediterranean from the eleventh century promoted a general European economic expansion that lasted until the early fourteenth century; and the expanding vitality of overland commerce, both north-south and then eastwest, contributed to general economic growth through its backward and forward linkages throughout a vast continental hinterland, especially in diverting underutilised resources from the large, generally backward agrarian sector into the more productive industrial, commercial, and financial sectors.
Conversely, he argued, the relative shift of international trade from transcontinental to the new maritime routes in the early fourteenth century ultimately had a negative, depressing impact on the aggregate economy of late-medieval Europe. The consequent contraction in overland, continental trade, beginning with the Champagne Fairs and its arterial routes, soon spread via many more tributary routes into various regional and local trade networks that serviced thousands of towns and villages throughout the vast continental hinterland, thus reducing the demand for transport and commercial services, labour, manufactures, foodstuffs and other goods. Declining consumption in turn reduced investment and aggregate incomes by a reverse multiplier-accelerator effect. To be sure the diversion of international trade flows into new shipping lanes certainly benefited the major participants: the maritime towns of Italy, Catalonia, the Netherlands, the Baltic, and even England; but their impressive gains could not offset the much greater aggregate economic decline in latemedieval Europe's continental hinterlands. Furthermore, this diversion of international trade tended to concentrate wealth and income flows into fewer hands, especially in those maritime towns, with In essence, Pirenne's thesis posited an economic retrogression in early medieval Europe, with a rapid 7 decline in its seaborne international trade, as the consequence of Muslim conquests of Mediterranean sea-lanes; and subsequently, an Italian counter-attack, the revival of both Mediterranean seaborne and overland longdistance trade, which fostered economic revival, urban growth, and general economic development from the early eleventh century. See Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris, 1937) 1300 -1460 (1969 reissued Cambridge, 1975) ; Robert Lopez and Harry Miskimin, 'The Economic Depression of the Renaissance, ' Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 14 (1962) commerce, had fully superseded the earlier fair-letters (instrumenta ex causa cambii), then how do we explain the phenomenon of the bill or letter obligatory. The direct ancestor of the modern promissory note, it had become a fully negotiable bearer bill, much more so than the Italian bill of exchange, by the later fifteenth century, and was far more prominent than bills of exchange in transacting commerce and finance --including short-term public lending --both in London and in Antwerp, i.e Countries (1994) .
Furthermore, the data-free econometric model (by his colleague Theo Peeters) that constitutes the 13 remaining nine pages of the article only serves to obfuscate the model and, I fear, to dissuade many historians from taking it as seriously as this seminal article most certainly should be taken. expansion of transcontinental trade from the mid-fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries, but more strikingly, the revival of periodic international fairs along those overland routes: the very numerous fairs, and seasonal cycles of adjacent fairs, not only in Brabant itself --the four fairs of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom but also in Frankfurt, Besançon, Lyons, Geneva, and Cremona.
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The fundamental weaknesses of the Van der Wee thesis, however, lies in the construction of his Annales article; for, in the space of just 16 pages, he obviously could not provide much additional evidence for an international-trade model that spans six centuries. But even more serious is the 13 inadequate explanation for the earlier, fourteenth-century shift from transcontinental to maritime trade, whose actual timing is left vague, though it was presumably already underway by the 1320s. He seems to suggest, more in accordance with traditional views than with the logic of his model, that it took place because the Italians found the direct-sea route to Flanders more cost-effective and advantageous, especially with various advances in both ship design and navigation. But most of the supposed cost-savings advances, and especially the advances in naval technology that finally produced the caravel-designs and the full-rigged carracks came a full century after that shift to maritime trade. Postan continues: 'Inefficient the service certainly was, wasteful of manpower and other resources; but so was medieval industry and agriculture.... To put it more abstractly, the proportion of trading costs to total costs was probably less in the Middle Ages than now, which is merely another way of saying that far greater economies have resulted from industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than from corresponding improvements in transport and distribution.' uncertainty, political in origin, than from high costs of an inefficient transport service.' 16 These issues do play a role in Van der Wee's trade model, in the form of the Hundred Years' War (1336-1453). In his view, even if that conflict had begun much too late to explain the initial shift to maritime trade, it both reinforced and prolonged that shift by so frequently disrupting the major overland trade routes. Van der Wee, however, overlooked an earlier series of wars, more debilitating than any since the Carolingian era, which even more directly disrupted these overland routes, forcing the Italians to establish the safer sea route to north west Europe. This new era of widespread warfare had commenced, in north-west Europe, during the 1290s, with the Anglo-French and Franco-Flemish wars, followed by Flemish civil wars (to 1328). In the south the Angevin-Aragonese wars, embroiling Aragon-Catalonia, southern France, Sicily, Naples, and the Papacy, had begun even earlier but reached their peak just before the truce of 1302. Shortly after, in 1310, Imperial German armies invaded Italy under the banner of Emperor Henry VII whose death in 1313 led to a decade-long civil war in southern Germany, and worse, to a resumption of the long-festering Angevin-Aragonese strife to become the even more ferocious and destructive Guelf-Ghibelline wars Elsewhere I have argued that steep increases not only in transport costs by both land and sea, but also more generally in other marketing, protection, and transaction costs, subsuming various other costs from taxes, trade-licences, and coinage debasements, were amongst the most harmful economic consequences of late-medieval warfare. For Low Countries, in particular, the once dominant exporttrade in cheaper, lighter textiles, especially from the aforementioned semi-worsted sayetteries, had virtually ceased by the 1320s, after these costs had risen above the prevailing market prices the Mediterranean basin; and the rational if not necessarily universal response of cloth producers was to become 'price-makers' rather than 'price-takers' based on quality-competition and thus reorient production to much more expensive, luxury quality woollens, which could better sustain these rising transportation and, in general, the complex set of transaction costs. The chief objective of this current study, as a sequel to the former, is to examine changes in the Netherlands' textile industries in the context of changing modes and cost structures of international transport and trade during the later fifteenth and early sixteenth-centuries: industrial changes that followed the revival and expansion of the transcontinental trade routes, and which produced an industrial structure more akin to that prevailing in the thirteenth than in the intervening conditions was a technological revolution in both mining and smelting that increased the output of both silver and copper in South Germany and adjacent Central Europe about five-or six-fold by the 1520s. The first stage was an innovation in mechanical engineering: new drainage pumps and adits (downward-slanted tunnels) that eliminated the long-pervasive problem of flooded mine shafts in mountainous Central Europe. The second was an even more important innovation in chemical engineering: the Seigerhütten process, using a lead catalyst in smelting silver-copper ores, to separate these previously inseparable metals. The copper so extracted from what became quite vast ore deposits also had considerable value, as the chief ingredient in making bronze artillery, which had already played a major role in ending the Hundred Years War.
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Virtually the entire era of the Central European mining boom, from the 1460s to the 1540s, coincides with the rise, expansion, and initial apogee of both the English cloth trade and the Antwerp market (see Table 2 Anglo-Burgundian Trade, ca. 1340 -1478 (Brussels, 1973 Munro, 'Central European Mining Boom', 119-84, especially tables 2, 4, and 5 (pp. 156-63) . By this debasement, the fine metal content of the silver penny was reduced exactly 20.00% from 0.8991 g. to 0.7193 g., which reduction thereby raised the value of a Tower Pound of silver 25.00%: from 30s 0d. to 37s 6d. sterling (or, per kilogram of fine silver, from £4.634 to £5.793). The reciprocal relationship between a debasement and the corresponding increase in the money-of-account value of the mint-weight of fine silver or gold is expressed by the equation: ?T = [1/(1 -x)] -1: in which T (traite) is the coined value of the mint weight (Tower Pound) in money-of-account, and x is the percentage reduction in the fine-metal content of the penny or other link-money for this money-of-account. In August 1464 and in March 1465, Edward IV reduced the fine gold content of the noble from 6.998 g. to 5.184 g, a reduction of 25.92%, which raised the value of the gold coinage (angelnoble and the new ryal or rose noble) by 35.0%, from £16.667 to £22.50 per Tower Pound of fine gold, the equivalent of a 25% debasement, by this formula. Soly, and Alfons Thijs, 'Nijverheid in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden,' Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 6: (Haarlem, 1979), 27-57; Alfons Thijs, Van 'werkwinkel' tot 'fabriek': de textielnijverheid te Antwerpen, einde 15de -begin 19de eeuw (Brussels, 1987) Unfortunately we still lack sufficient evidence to prove that in the sixteenth-century these overland routes had become cheaper than the maritime routes, not when the converse view remains so deeply routed in the annals of European economic history. Nevertheless we may, at the outset, 46 deduce from various developments in the sixteenth-century economy that transaction costs had again sufficiently fallen in long-distance trade to permit the Netherlands to be competitive once more in Mediterranean markets for cheaper textiles. The most obvious factor, already cited, was the restoration of relative security along the major trade routes, but perhaps more so on land than by sea.
But equally important, when the transaction sector was so subject to scale economies, was the rapid demographic, urban, and commercial expansion in sixteenth-century Europe, especially in the Mediterranean basin, which dramatically widened and deepened markets, providing much a more concentrated, larger-scale, and efficient commerce. markets. Thirdly, international trade in sixteenthcentury Europe benefited from many significant commercial-financial innovations: fully transferable and negotiable commercial bills and other improvements in both public and private finance, which halved interest rates by the 1550s; printed and widely disseminated 'currents' for both commodityprice and exchange-rates; the rise of specialized 'commission' houses (such as the Van der Molen firm); embryonic joint-stock companies; and large-scale warehousing facilities.
47
Since maritime commerce also shared in these improvements, the crucial innovations to be cited were those unique to overland transport. First and foremost was the rapid emergence of professional and specialized transport or cartage firms, which promoted the development of the new, larger-scale, lower-cost Hesse wagons (carts), in well organized convoys. These new transport firms offered merchants, both large and small, those selling in nearby or in distant overland markets, fully insured passage for their goods at predetermined, fixed rates; and they also provided an efficient overland postal service. Beginning with the Antwerp-Italy routes, these new modes of commercial transport soon spread to other overland routes servicing France, Germany, and Central Europe. Both
Brulez and Van der Wee believe that these major developments in overland transport soon made the continental overland routes both speedier and more reliable than Atlantic shipping routes from north- Low Countries to Italy, the distance --from Antwerp or Bruges to Venice in particular --was no more than 1300 km, less than 20 per cent of the distance by sea between these ports. Furthermore, both in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the shorter overland routes probably offered much greater volumes of commerce to be transacted en route, with far more frequent transactions, at lower marginal costs, than did maritime commerce with north-west Europe.
Finally, if the proof is in the pudding, the final proof for the economic superiority of the overland routes in sixteenth-century Europe must lie in the fact that they commanded such an overwhelmingly dominant share of the commercial traffic between Italy and the Low Countries.
Furthermore, parallelling the expansion of the overland continental routes was the sharp decline in
Italian galley-service to Flanders and England, which had clearly become an uneconomic form of commercial transport. The last Florentine galley arrived in 1478; and the Venetian galleys, after regular trips for most of the fifteenth century, failed to arrived in 1492, 1496-7, 1499, 1502, 1509-15, 1518, 1521-29, and 1531-32, making 
